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Words as Deeds:  
Wittgenstein‟s „spontaneous utterances‟ 
and the dissolution of the explanatory gap 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 Wittgenstein demystified the notion of „observational self-knowledge‟. He 
dislodged the long-standing conception that we have privileged access to our 
impressions, sensations and feelings through introspection, and more precisely 
eliminated knowing as the kind of awareness that normally characterizes our 
first-person present tense psychological statements. He was not thereby 
questioning our awareness of our emotions or sensations, but debunking the 
notion that we come to that awareness via any epistemic route. This makes the 
spontaneous linguistic articulation of our sensations and impressions 
nondescriptive. Not descriptions, but expressions that seem more akin to 
behaviour than to language. I suggest that Wittgenstein uncovered a new 
species of speech acts. Far from the prearranged consecration of words into 
performatives, utterances are deeds through their very spontaneity. This gives 
language a new aura: the aura of the reflex action. I argue, against Peter 
Hacker, that spontaneous utterances have the categorial status of deeds. This 
has no reductive consequences in that I do not suggest that one category is 
reduced to another, but that the boundary between them is porous. This 
explodes the myth of an explanatory gap between the traditionally distinct 
categories of saying (or thinking) and doing, or of mind and body.  
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Words as Deeds:  
Wittgenstein‟s „spontaneous utterances‟ 
and the dissolution of the explanatory gap 
 
 But instead of the intonation and the accompanying 
 gestures, I might ... treat the word itself as a  
 gesture. 
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar 
 
 
 Since Descartes first put it in the machine, not many philosophers have 
attempted to get the ghost out. Based on the mechanics of the body and still 
alive in the Physicalists and Functionalists of today, the idea is that whatever we 
think or do must have first been processed in some way. This, in itself, would be 
trivially acceptable if the process were not posited as explanatory. If that is, it 
were a mere mechanical description of what happens in our bodies when we 
speak or move, a description having no significant link with why we speak or 
move – with our (particular) reasons for saying 'Good morning' or waving good-
bye. But according to Physicalists and Functionalists, our thinking and acting 
are not only causally dependent on some hardware, be it a neurological or 
functional (computer-like) framework, they are grounded on it, or reducible to it. 
The brain is not merely one of the vital organs without which we cannot live, and 
therefore think or act, it is -- unlike the heart or the liver -- the very source of our 
acting and thinking. Not simply a mechanical enabler, the brain is the generator 
of our wills, desires, intentions and actions. Of course the outside world has 
some impact on us (e.g. I see an apple), but in order for the body to react, this 
impact must be translated or transmuted into something that can trigger a move. 
A belief („this is an apple‟) or will („I want this apple‟) is therefore posited as the 
reason that causes the body to move (I reach out for the apple). But how can 
something as ethereal as a belief or a will activate something as physical as my 
hand and make it reach out for the apple? How can a mental state cause a 
muscle to contract? In an attempt to bridge this explanatory gap between the 
mind and the body, philosophers have sought to formalize or to naturalize our 
intentions, beliefs or thoughts. Like Searle and Fodor, they have vainly 
attempted to transform our intentions into efficient, physically empowered 
triggers that can move our tongues to speak and our hands to reach out; they 
have sought to transmute a ghostly belief or thought into some biological, formal 
or propositional form that could then supposedly activate the machine.  
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 According to such Ghost-in-the-Machine philosophers
1
, we think the 
thoughts we do and perform the acts we do because of some prior internal 
cognitive processing. Some spectral belief, will or intention must be there to 
preface what we say and to trigger our moves. Spontaneous utterances, 
however, are exemplary cases of expressions that are not the result of any 
cognitive process. They also precipitate the dissolution of the explanatory gap, 
itself an avatar of body-mind dualism, in that -- as will be argued here -- a 
spontaneous utterance is equivalent to a deed. To say as much is not to herald 
a behaviourist revival. It is not claimed that all words are reducible to acts, but 
that the case of spontaneous utterances evinces that there is no logical 
categorial gap between words and deeds, between mental states and 
behaviour, which would require a reductive transformation of one into the other. 
That is, the categories of speaking (or thinking) and doing are still alive and 
well, but they are porous. 
 
1. Not a question of knowing 
 
 - Do you feel like singing? said Camier. 
 - Not to my knowledge, said Mercier. 
 From Mercier and Camier by Samuel Beckett  
 
 
 I have often come upon tentative readers of Wittgenstein who tell me 
how, offended by his stabs at what can be called „observational self-knowledge‟, 
they have turned away in disbelief: „how can it be said I don‟t know I‟m in pain!‟ 
What these readers fail to grasp is Wittgenstein‟s precision here: he is 
eliminating knowing as the kind of awareness that normally characterizes being 
in pain. His aim is not to invalidate awareness of one‟s pain, but to debunk the 
notion that one comes to that awareness via introspective observation, or via 
any epistemic route at all. We say we know something when we have acquired 
that information from observation, recollection, inference or research. But it is 
through none of these routes that I am aware of my own pain. In fact, I follow no 
route at all, for there is no gap between my pain and my awareness of it. I 
cannot be in pain without being aware of it. Moreover, the problem with knowing 
is that it is not infallible. To acquire knowledge is to acquire information, and 
information is susceptible of error. I can be wrong about something I thought I 
knew, but I cannot make a mistake about being in pain. Even in cases of self-
delusion, the (phantom) pain is felt. The logical infallibility characteristic of one‟s 
awareness of being in pain is not covered by knowing. But this is true of many 
other first-person present tense uses of psychological verbs: 
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"I know what I want, wish, believe, feel, ......" (and so on through all the 
psychological verbs) is either philosophers' nonsense, or at any rate not a 
judgement a priori. 
"I know..." may mean "I do not doubt..." but does not mean that the 
words "I doubt..." are senseless, that doubt is logically excluded.  
One says "I know" where one can also say "I believe" or "I suspect"; 
where one can find out. (PI p. 221; first emphasis mine) 
 
 First-person present tense psychological statements Wittgenstein views 
as typically nonepistemic expressions, some of which are more akin to 
behaviour than to sentences. They predominantly belong to our primitive, not to 
our sophisticated use of language. A „that-clause‟ is not always a harbinger of 
propositional thought. We shall see that some articulations of so-called 
propositional attitudes are not really propositional  at all: to say „I believe that ....‟ 
or „I want that...‟ is not always to adopt a propositional attitude. It is not only 
mental events such as pain that are not subjectible to propositional form, but 
some cases of belief, desire, expectation, intention etc. The deciding factor here 
is whether a deliverance is a description or an expression. And in some cases, 
deliverances of belief, desire, expectation, intention are just such expressions. 
 
2. Descriptions vs. Expressions (or Utterances) 
 
 For words do not all have the same function: some steer, some describe, 
others express
2
. As regards our first-person present tense psychological 
statements (e.g. „I am in pain‟, „I hope he comes‟, „I am afraid‟), they have 
traditionally been regarded as descriptive: the utterance „I am in pain‟ thought to 
be a privileged and infallible description resulting from my introspection of my 
mental state of being in pain. Wittgenstein, however, perceived that our first-
person psychological statements are, for the most part, not descriptions, but 
expressions: 
 
Surely one doesn‟t normally say “I wish ...” on grounds of self-
observation [Selbstbeobachtung], for this is merely an expression 
[Äusserung] of a wish. Nevertheless, you can sometimes perceive or 
discover a wish by observing your own reactions. (RPP II, 3) 
 
Or, to return to our first example, when asked by my doctor to describe my 
present state, I reflect and answer: „I am in pain‟ as I seek to describe the 
symptoms of the pain, point to its localization, say when it started, etc. 
Wittgenstein did not then -- as is often assumed -- rule out a descriptive or self-
observing use of first-person psychological verbs, but he held it to be secondary 
to the expressive
3
, which is nondescriptive. He usually refers to the 
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nondescriptive deliverances of our psychological states as "utterances" 
(Äusserungen) or “expressions” (Ausdrücke)
4
.  
 
 To say that an expression is nondescriptive is to say that, in using it, the 
speaker does not describe anything (like an emotion or sensation that she 
allegedly has privileged, introspective access to); she is not articulating an 
informative conclusion she has come to from self-observation, not issuing a 
proposition open to falsification and verification. A nondescriptive expression 
can be informative, but only to third parties. My spontaneous „I want to die!‟ is 
nondescriptive in that it is not a propositional rendering of a desire I have 
observed in myself, but it may be news to my therapist. 
 
3. Spontaneity: the distinguishing feature 
 
 It is not always easy to distinguish between descriptive and expressive 
language-games. Indeed, the very same string of words may be either 
descriptive (a report) or expressive (a manifestation) of a state of mind: 
 
When someone says “I hope he‟ll come” -- is this a report  [Bericht] 
about his state of mind, or a manifestation [Äusserung] of his hope? -- I can, 
for example, say it to myself. And surely I am not giving myself a report. It 
may be a sigh; but it need not. (PI 585) 
 
I say “I am afraid”; someone else asks me: “What was that? A cry of 
fear; or do you want to tell me how you feel; or is it a reflection on your 
present state?” (PI p. 187)  
 
The difference lies not in the words themselves, but in the circumstances of 
their pronouncement: 
 
The exclamation “I‟m longing to see him!” may be called an act [Akt] of 
expecting. But I can utter the same words as the result of self-observation 
[Selbstbeobachtung], and then they might mean: “So, after all that has 
happened, I am still longing to see him.” The point is: what led up to these 
words? (PI 586) 
 
 What is the setting, the context, the origin of utterance? In expressive 
utterances, no reflection leads up to the words. They are uttered, as it were, 
without a thought. We can gather from Wittgenstein‟s numerous comparative 
analyses that the distinguishing feature between descriptive and nondescriptive 
uses of first-person present tense psychological utterances is: spontaneity; a 
spontaneous deliverance being one that is not due to thought, that no reflection 
or 'self-observation' has 'led up to'. Spontaneous expressions of pain do not 
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describe our internal states, or at least they never intend to. There is no room 
where description can take place, no self-observing gap between the feeling or 
sensation and its spontaneous expression: "For how can I go so far as to try to 
use language to get between pain and its expression [Äusserung]" (PI 245). In 
our spontaneous deliverances of desire, belief, sensation and emotion, the word 
is not a detached report of the pain or desire felt, not a description, but the 
expression of pain or desire. Spontaneous expressions are nondescriptive, 
unverified, unreasoned expressions. They are not due to introspection, self-
observation, cognition or recognition:  
 
“Does someone crying out “Help!” want to describe how he is feeling? 
Nothing is further from his intentions than describing something. (LW I, 
48) 
 
 Spontaneity, then, forms the dividing line between first-person present 
tense psychological expressions and descriptions. But within the category of 
spontaneous expressions, a further dichotomy must be made. Whilst no 
reasoning informs the use of any of our spontaneous utterances, some are 
emotionally (or sensationally) charged, and others emotionally (or sensationally) 
neutral. In Insight and Illusion, Hacker gives varied examples of spontaneous 
utterances (which he calls „avowals'
5
): 
 
...exclamations (I‟m so pleased‟), cries of pain („It hurts, it hurts!), sighs 
of longing („Oh, I do hope he‟ll come‟), expressions of emotion („I‟m furious 
with you‟) or expectation („I expect you to come‟), avowals of thought or 
belief, expressions of desire („I want a glass of wine‟) or preference („I like 
claret‟) and so forth. ... (1989, 298) 
 
These are all spontaneous utterances, but they are not all of the same nature. 
Rather than follow Hacker in distinguishing them according to their being or not 
“expressions of experiences” (ibid.), I shall distinguish between compulsive and 
neutral spontaneous expressions
6
. Compulsive spontaneous utterances are 
compelled by, expressive of, and (we shall see) sometimes also part of, active 
states of emotion and sensation
7
. These, we can’t help using: 
 
Suppose I said: The expressions get their importance from the fact that 
they are not used coolly but that we can‟t help using them. (LPE 281) 
 
First, let us examine our less compulsive spontaneous utterances.  
 
4. Neutral spontaneous utterances 
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 Though they are spontaneous in that they are not the product of self-
observation, description, or reflection, some first-person psychological 
expressions do not compulsively spring from the heart, but soberly inform („I like 
claret‟) or demand („I want a glass of wine‟). Where the sole raison d’être of 
compulsive utterances is expression, and where their utterance is comparable 
to a reflex action, neutral spontaneous utterances are intentional: they are 
intentionally informative and require a third party. Spontaneous, but not 
compulsive; they do not resemble reflex actions. Still, like compulsive 
utterances, neutral utterances are not propositions insofar as they are not 
descriptions, not falsifiable conclusions of self-observation. It must be stressed 
that for some spontaneous utterances to be emotionally neutral does not mean 
that they are the product of reflection or self-observation. In no way are they 
descriptions. 
 
 Of course, there are many cases where our formulations of belief or 
preference are descriptive. Upon being asked whether or not he believes in an 
after-life, someone who had not before given it much thought, will do some soul-
searching to come to a conclusion. Or again, when questioned as to whether 
she prefers the wines of Bordeaux or Burgundy, someone who had never 
previously considered it, will hesitate and ponder before replying. In both these 
cases, replies will be first-person present tense psychological deliverances (e.g. 
„I guess I don‟t believe in an after-life‟; „Come to think of it, I prefer Bordeaux -- I 
tend to buy it more often than Burgundy‟), but not of the spontaneous type. 
These are neither compulsive nor neutral expressions, but cool (they are „used 
coolly‟; cf. LPE 281 above) or reflective descriptions: statements resulting from 
thought, deliberation, reflection and possibly intent on deceiving.  
 
 In contrast, someone well acquainted with wine, who has come to have a 
well-seasoned preference, need undergo no such precursory reflection. Her 
response will be automatic -- which does not mean that she has never given the 
matter a thought, only that she did not do it, did not need to do it, on this 
occasion. Having for many years frequented the small, welcoming vineyards of 
Burgundy, familiarized myself with their warm, textured, dark-fruity, flowery 
flavours, built up a respectable collection of Vosne-Romanées and the like, and 
having comparatively sampled many a stern, majestic Bordeaux, I, upon being 
asked, express my predilection for Burgundy without hesitation or pondering. My 
expression of preference is as little due to reflection, introspection, and 
therefore as barred from the possibility of pretence as „My name is Danièle‟.  
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 „I prefer Burgundy‟: this may be a spontaneous utterance or a pondered 
description. Circumstances, not appearance, determine the nature of our words. 
Identical strings of words will form, in one context, a spontaneous utterance; in 
another, a report or description. Whereas spontaneous deliverances of what 
one believes or prefers are more likely to fall under the neutral category, 
spontaneous utterances of emotion or sensation are likely to of the compulsive 
variety.  
 
5. Compulsive spontaneous utterances: words as verbalized reactions 
 
 ... sometimes it seemed as if speech came to 
 me without any will of my own, and words were 
 given to me that came out as the tears come, 
 because our hearts are full and we can’t help it. 
 From Adam Bede by George Eliot 
 
 When utterances are compulsive, it is as if we did not use words, rather 
they seem to come out -- unprompted by ourselves -- in a bang or a whimper: 
 
In this way I should like to say the words "Oh, let him come!" are charged 
with my desire. And words can be wrung from us, -- like a cry. Words can 
be hard to say: such, for example, as are used to effect a renunciation, or to 
confess a weakness. (Words are also deeds.) (PI 546) 
 
 Words are also deeds. This, then, not only alludes to the active aspect of 
language generally -- to speak is to act -- premised in speech-act theory; nor is 
it sufficiently covered by Wittgenstein‟s overall pragmatic view of language -- 
words are used and language in use is a language-game -- rather, it points out a 
particularity of some words. If, generally, words are also deeds, specifically, 
some words are, in some contexts, only deeds. They do not describe a 
psychological state but are the verbal replacement of the nonverbal expression 
of a psychological state: “words are connected with the primitive
8
, the natural, 
expressions [Ausdruck] of the sensation and used in their place” (PI 244). So 
that nonverbal expressions such as a cry of pain or despair, an act of desire or 
surrender are replaced with verbal ones, such as: „I am in pain‟, „I grieve‟, „Oh, 
let him come!‟, „I want to die‟. As children, we were taught to thus replace our 
nonverbal reactions with verbal ones: 
 
A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and 
teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new 
pain-behaviour. (PI 244) 
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The word, exclamation, or sentence assimilated as a replacement of the natural 
expression is itself behaviour. It is not a clearer, more eloquent description of 
the sensation, but constitutes an alternative expression of the sensation -- an 
alternate mode of behaviour: “the verbal expression [Ausdruck] of pain replaces 
crying and does not describe it” (PI 244). So that where we use words in the 
place of groans, this replacement does not entail a categorial change; but only a 
change of manner or manifestation. In emotion and sensation, where our 
original spontaneity has been least subject to the mutations of sophistication, 
the word, often is a deed, nothing but a deed: 
 
The exclamation “I‟m longing to see him!” may be called an act of 
expecting (PI 586; my emphasis) 
 
 We must however beware not to confuse the deed or behaviour with the 
sensation itself. That some words are in some contexts categorially assimilable 
to behaviour does not make them identical to the sensation or feeling 
expressed. Peter Hacker does well to remind us: “behaviour is not a sensation!” 
(1993, 262). And yet Wittgenstein does mention cases where we could not 
dissociate the behaviour from the sensation itself. It is sometimes possible to 
say that the behavioural expression is part of the feeling or sensation: 
 
For think of the sensations produced by physically shuddering: the 
words “it makes me shiver” are themselves such a shuddering reaction; and 
if I hear and feel them as I utter them, this belongs among the rest of those 
sensations. (PI p. 174) 
 
 This is how words are best at being deeds. This is also where the 
boundaries between world and language dissolve; where behaviour and 
language melt into one another, become indistinguishable; where the word is 
behaviour, a reflex action
9
. Here, Wittgenstein has uncovered a new category of 
utterances, never before picked out by philosophy. Resembling Austin‟s 
performatives in that they are linguistic utterances whose grammatical 
determination as acts  is dependent on context, they part company in their being 
independent of conventional procedure. Far from the prearranged or 
conventionally fixed consecration of words into performatives, utterances are 
deeds through their very spontaneity. This gives language, or a part of 
language, a new aura. The aura of the unpremeditated act, the reflex action. 
 
 The compulsive expression -- whether the act of crying or that of saying 'I 
am in pain' -- is in both cases a reaction, though the latter, a more complicated 
form of the reaction. It is not, that is, available to infants or animals. Not a 
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translation or description resulting from my observation of my internal state, 
compulsive expressions are simply another version of the tears or the cry of 
agony -- “articulated crying” as Fogelin eloquently puts it (1987, 170). 
 
6. The leveling of the linguistic and the nonlinguistic 
 
 ... why should the wordless shudder be the ground of 
 the verbal one? (PI, p. 174; my emphasis) 
 
 Nonverbal expressions have traditionally been categorized as deeds; 
verbal ones as language
10
, regardless of function. And yet it is precisely 
function, use, grammar, not appearance, that should determine categorial 
distinctions. The Wittgensteinian motto: “nothing is hidden” is not everywhere 
applicable. The configurations of ordinary language mask and misrepresent 
grammatical differences. Wittgenstein has uncovered an analogy, a sameness 
in what appear to be disparate language-games. In those cases where the 
linguistic expression springs from an emotion or sensation, in the manner of a 
moan or a groan, of a cri du coeur, the linguistic is at par with the nonlinguistic: 
my spontaneous: „It hurts!‟ is as much an act as my groaning or moving my 
finger away from the flame. Although a groan does not physically resemble a 
sentence, when both are spontaneously expressed their „grammar‟ is 
fundamentally the same, and so a crucial rapprochement is wanting. We must 
be able to neglect the linguistic aspect of an expression in our assignation of 
grammatical function; and embrace the idea of the assimilation of all 
spontaneous utterances, regardless of form. This assimilation is rejected by 
Peter Hacker: 
 
It is important to emphasize that Wittgenstein was not assimilating 
avowals to the natural expression of „inner states‟. An avowal of pain is not 
just like a groan, and it would be as misleading to say that it has the same 
logical status as a groan as it is to assimilate it to description. For there are 
differences as well as similarities. An utterance (Äusserung) of pain, unlike 
a moan, is articulate; it is a linguistic expression consisting of words in 
grammatical combination. A sentence that can be used in a spontaneous 
avowal has other uses too. It can be embedded in the antecedent of a 
conditional, it has an intelligible negation, and there are tense transforms 
of such a sentence. These cases are not expressions or manifestations of 
inner states and must be treated differently. (1993, 90) 
 
 Of course an avowal of pain is not just like a groan. It looks or sounds 
different: it is comprised of words, as opposed to mere sounds. And yet this 
should not lead to the conclusion that its logical status is thereby different from 
that of a groan. Here, Hacker is guilty of the sort of confusion Wittgenstein was 
wariest of: conflating appearance and use. Identical appearance does not give 
 11 
words used in different contexts the same meaning, but neither does it give 
them the same logical status. That a sentence has, in one of its uses, the 
potential to be embedded in the antecedent of a conditional or negated should 
not presume on the logical status of its other uses. There is no infectious 
symmetry here, no transitivity. Granted, Hacker is not conflating two distinct 
uses of the same string of words; he is not saying that an avowal can be 
embedded in the antecedent of a conditional etc., but he is saying that the fact 
that in another use, it can be, affects the logical status of the avowal itself. It 
does not. The syntactic and propositional characteristics of the description do 
not overlap into the nondescriptive, nonreflective utterance, even when the 
latter is identical in appearance to the former. What applies to four words that 
make up a descriptive statement does not apply to four identical words when 
they are used as the spontaneous expression of a sensation. We must dismiss 
appearance as contributing to use, and accept that something that has the 
appearance of a sentence can be grammatically barred from sentential use: “If 
you look at the use of what appears to be a statement you may find it is not a 
statement” (AWL 156). Looking like a statement does not condemn a string of 
words to the logical status of a description. The descriptive: „I‟m in love‟ can be 
embedded in the antecedent of a conditional, put in the interrogative, negated 
etc., not the nondescriptive one. The nondescriptive one is grammatically 
equivalent to a sigh. And a sigh cannot be negated. 
 
7. The new boundary line: spontaneous versus descriptive 
 
 Traditional focus on the linguistic aspect of spontaneous utterances has 
blinded us to their often exclusively pragmatic nature: their being the linguistic 
equivalents of acts, such as groaning or crying. Wittgenstein‟s point was that 
something‟s being couched in words does not entail a difference in nature with 
something that is not couched in words. Our spontaneous linguistic expressions 
are not (vertical) derivations, but (horizontal) extensions of our primitive, 
spontaneous language-games: “why should the wordless shudder be the ground 
of the verbal one?”; “The primitive reaction may have been a glance or a 
gesture, but it may also have been a word” (PI, pp. 174, 218; my emphasis). 
Using words, in some contexts, has no further resonance than making a “natural 
sound” (RPP II, 176). Many of our first-person psychological statements have 
the grammatical status of behaviour. That they should be verbal does not entail 
that they are the product of reasoning, conceptualization or self-observation. As 
Norman Malcolm puts it: “The learned verbal expressions of pain, or fright, are 
 12 
no more due to thinking or reasoning than is the unlearned preverbal behaviour” 
(1986, 148). There is a use of words which does not grammatically differ from 
nonlinguistic, indeed from animal, behaviour. 
 
 What Wittgenstein does not sufficiently make clear is that his analogy 
between words and deeds is not one between spontaneous words and any 
deed, but between spontaneous words and spontaneous deeds. For, to equate 
some strings of words with deeds or behaviour is not necessarily to remove 
them from the realm of premeditation or indeed, deception -- a groan can be as 
intentionally deceptive as a statement: it can be used in the place of a word or a 
sentence as a response to a question, and that response can be the fruit of 
pretence. What does exclude both acts and words from the possibility of 
deception is their spontaneity, their not being, as Malcolm puts it, "due to 
thinking or reasoning". To say that some utterances are spontaneous is to say 
that they are not descriptions, and therefore cannot be lies. First-person 
psychological spontaneous expressions are the most reliable strings of words 
uttered by human beings. Again, Peter Hacker disagrees. 
 
8. Spontaneous lies? 
 
 Reflecting on the spectrum he has drawn, which opposes “Avowals and 
descriptions”
11
, Hacker admits that all avowals (be they, in his terms: 
experiential or not; in my terms: compulsive or neutral) are nondescriptive and 
not susceptible of mistake, but some, he believes, can nevertheless be lies: 
 
At this end of the spectrum the concept of description gets no grip, nor 
does that of truth. Of course, dissimulation and deceit are possible. (1989, 
298) 
 
 One wants to ask: how are deceit and dissimulation possible where truth 
gets no grip? Hacker‟s continuum is linguistic, and he also views it as 
propositional (1996, 181). Yet propositionality implies susceptibility to truth and 
falsity, and Hacker rightly insists that truth gets no grip at the „avowal‟ end of the 
spectrum. So where does Hacker stand? In Meaning and Mind (1993), he 
reiterates the inapplicability of the concepts of truth, falsehood, mistake and 
description to avowals and again does not thereby eliminate the possibility of 
dissimulation and deception, but he is clearer as to which avowals are open to 
this possibility: 
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The diversity is indefinitely large... But in all these cases the concept of 
description gets no grip. ... Indeed the concepts of truth and falsehood are 
typically out of place here, although dissimulation and deception are 
possible in such contexts, as indeed they are with groans, smiles, or 
laughs. Similarly, the more utterances approximate to exclamations, the 
less room there is for evaluating them as sincere or insincere; for this 
dimension of evaluation gets a firmer grip in relation to articulate 
expression of one‟s inner life, confessions, and telling others how one feels 
or what one thinks. (1993, 93; latter emphasis mine) 
 
Here, Hacker makes a distinction between avowals that are more linguistically 
articulate (i.e. that more resemble and are closer to the „descriptions‟ end of the 
continuum), such as confessing -- and there, sees room for dissimulation and 
pretence -- and those, like exclamations, where he sees less room. Utterances 
are evaluated as open to dissimulation or insincerity the more linguistically 
articulate they are. And pretence can be logically excluded only in extreme, 
presumably nonlinguistic, cases: “If someone is thrown into the flames, etc., it 
makes no sense to say „Maybe he is not in pain, but just pretending‟. There are 
circumstances in which one may say that there is no such thing as pretending” 
(1993, 264). But Wittgenstein‟s point is precisely that pretence is logically 
excluded not only in extreme, unambiguous cases such as someone being 
thrown in the flames, or a baby crying, but in all spontaneous utterances. They 
are all, at par with such obvious cases. It is their being spontaneous, not their 
being exclamations, that makes them logically impervious to pretence. It isn‟t 
the brevity of an expression or its apparent similarity to a nonverbal expression 
that makes an utterance spontaneous -- a three year-old can say: „Ouch!‟ 
although her fall did not hurt, merely to get her mother‟s attention; conversely, a 
spontaneous outpouring of emotion can last a very articulate hour. The 
determining feature here is whether or not the expression is spontaneous, not 
whether or not it resembles a sentence.  
 
9. There are confessions and there are confessions 
 
A confession is not always sincere or spontaneous: it can be 
premeditated or the result of more or less elaborate preparations, such as 
Augustine, Rousseau or De Quincey put in their Confessions. We can speak of 
a false confession, such as a mother wanting to save her child, confessing to 
his crime; of a mistaken confession, such as someone confessing to a murder 
they thought they had committed (it was a set-up and the gun fired blanks); of a 
fictional confession, such as the Confessions of Felix Krull: Confidence Man. A 
confession can consist of two volumes, three pages, a single word, a nod or an 
eye movement. Whether it is a truthful or a deceptive confession has nothing to 
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do with its appearance, but only with the circumstances of its pronouncement. 
The very same words (e.g. 'I did it!') can be used to formulate a premeditated or 
a spontaneous confession, a truthful or a deceptive confession. Rather than 
decide that not all cases of confessing are spontaneous avowals, Hacker places 
"articulate expression of one's inner life, confessions, and telling others how one 
feels or what one thinks" en masse in the avowal end of the spectrum, and is 
then left having to account for cases of deceptive avowals. He does this by 
insisting that their being, by (his own) definition, spontaneous, nondescriptive, 
not susceptible of truth or falsity does not prevent some avowals from being lies. 
So that, on Hacker's view, a person can lie unthinkingly, and can lie about 
something which she does not hold as either true or false. Granted, an avowal 
cannot be mistaken because it is not a description, but it can be insincere, 
contends Hacker: 
 
My confession of my thoughts may be inadequate, but not because I 
have made a mistake -- rather because I have been untruthful or have held 
something crucial back, have exaggerated or understated. (1993, 95) 
 
Hacker believes that excluding the possibility of mistake sufficiently guarantees 
the nondescriptive status of „avowals‟. It does not. The possibility of pretence 
too must be excluded. For to lie about something is to make a consciously false 
description. And Hacker himself recognizes that “in all these cases the concept 
of description gets no grip”. So how can he admit lies, which are false 
statements or descriptions, into the category of nondescriptive avowals? In 
Insight and Illusion, Hacker foresees the objection -- that lying presupposes 
knowing (so that their being noncognitive logically makes avowals impervious to 
pretence): 
 
One is inclined to think that the possibility of insincerity betokens the 
necessity of knowledge. For if I can lie to you about my thoughts, I must 
know them! To lie is surely to say what one knows to be false with intent to 
deceive. (1989, 300) 
 
Hacker then attempts to justify the possibility of lying without being aware of 
doing so by rightly disconnecting lying from knowledge: 
 
One will still want to object: surely when I lie about my thoughts or 
feelings I know or am conscious that I am really thinking or feeling thus-
and-so and not as I said? This is wrong, for the very phrase „to know that I 
am lying‟ is misleading. One ... does not find out that one is lying. One does 
not „know‟ that one is lying ... Of course I know later that I have lied, but not 
because I knew earlier, but because I lied earlier. (1989, 300) 
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All in all, if I don‟t know my feelings to start with, how can I be said to be lying 
about them? Because we cannot be said to know we are lying -- for reasons 
similar to those that preclude us from knowing that we are in pain, Hacker 
concludes that it is possible to lie unawares, as it were -- spontaneously. But 
that is to neglect other types of assurance, noncognitive types of assurance, 
that give pretence its needed awareness. Knowing is not our only way of being 
sure, as Wittgenstein makes clear in On Certainty
12
.  
 
Of course, there are premeditated, insincere confessions, but they are 
not avowals; they are cases where the concept of description does get a grip. 
Inasmuch as Hacker has placed 'confessions' in that end of the spectrum where 
"the concept of description gets no grip", he has made them ipso facto immune 
to the possibility of deception. To evaluate a spontaneous confession as 
possibly deceitful is as much grammatical nonsense as to evaluate a 
spontaneous moan as possibly deceitful. In certain circumstances, it will be 
grammatical nonsense to think of any expression -- be it a confession or a moan 
-- as dissimulative: 
 
When I say that moaning is the expression of t[oothache], then under 
certain circ[umstance]s the possibility of it being the expression without the 
feeling behind it mustn't enter my game. 
It is nonsense to say: the expression  [Ausdruck] may always lie. 
The language games with expressions of feelings (private experiences) 
are based on games with expressions of which we don’t say that they may 
lie. (LPE 245; my emphasis) 
 
 It is nonsense to say that the expression may always lie. Of course 
expressions can be deceitful, but not spontaneous expressions. They are the 
genuine item, the pretence-free basis which deception learns to imitate. There is 
no room for dissimulation in a spontaneous utterance because it is an 
unreasoned expression: “How is a lie possible in a case where there is no 
justification?” (LPE 250). If an expression is spontaneous, it is by definition not 
mediated, and therefore cannot be contrived, deceitful, premeditated or 
manipulated: “The expressions get their importance from the fact that they are 
not used coolly but that we can’t help using them “ (LPE 281; my emphasis). 
Sincerity is inherent in, definitive of, spontaneous utterances; and not, as 
Hacker seems to think, optional. 
 
 A spontaneous utterance is an élan, an uncontrolled movement, an 
impulsive act: “the word which you utter is a reaction” (LPE 249; my emphasis). 
In the realm of the spontaneous, the utterance is itself the measure or criterion 
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of sincerity; its mere occurrence guarantees its truthfulness
13
. Spontaneous 
utterances are not propositions, descriptions, or lies. Some words are, in some 
contexts, nothing but unknowing deeds. 
 
10. Nonpropositional Attitudes 
 
 Words and deeds. Analogously: mind and body. To insist on the 
insuperability of the distinction between words and deeds betrays an aversion to 
throwing off mind-body dualism. Hacker‟s claim that because sentences (in their 
most common use) can be syntactically manipulated, they cannot (in any use) 
be the equivalent of deeds, denotes a conservative reluctance to relax 
traditional dichotomies. But Wittgenstein‟s philosophy, his contribution to our 
better understanding of ourselves, hinges on precisely such a relaxation, if not 
wholesale rejection, of our traditional dichotomies. A more perspicuous 
rearrangement of our concepts can only result from a disturbance of our 
dormant dichotomies, not a smug brandishing of them. The attenuation of word-
deed or language-act dualism is crucial to Wittgenstein‟s philosophical 
enterprise. It is not only conspicuous in his treatment of rules, hinge beliefs (in 
On Certainty
14
), and of course spontaneous utterances, it is the very life-blood 
of his later pragmatism. To suggest that Wittgenstein could not have envisaged 
the possible equivalence of act and deed is not only to ignore his various 
injunctions to “treat the word itself as a gesture” (PG 66), it is, more 
consequentially, to trivialize his pragmatism, to prevent it from solving or rather, 
dissolving, one of our most persistent philosophical problems -- that of the 
explanatory gap. 
 
 The body-mind problem can be approached from several angles. Ryle‟s 
bête noire was the category mistake of viewing mental phenomena as if they 
were ethereal versions of physical phenomena. Envisaging the mind as 
functioning in ways analogous to the body forces us to posit inner causes of our 
words and deeds. But because it is after all the realm of the mind that is in 
question, these causes cannot be outrightly mechanical, and so reasons take 
the place of mechanical causes. Beliefs, intentions, desires, are posited as the 
reasons prompting what we say and do. They are the ghosts that activate the 
machine. The really damaging consequence here is reductionism -- reducing 
mental phenomena, such as thoughts, desires, beliefs to physical entities so as 
to invest them with some concrete efficacy. Attempts to reduce the mental to 
the physical are altogether misdirected. What needs be done is to deny the very 
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existence of a gap: rather than strive to materialize ghosts, we should denounce 
their fictitiousness. In cautioning us against the overriding influence of 
mechanical pictures in our understanding of the mental, Ryle‟s intention was not 
to urge that we steer both categories well clear of each other, thereby 
deepening an alleged gap. Far from stressing a categorical categorial division 
between the mental and the physical, Ryle did more than his share to dissipate 
“the hallowed contrast between Mind and Matter” (1949,23). 
 
 Categories have their purpose, but they should serve not dominate. It 
was the tyranny of (Frege‟s) concepts with sharp boundaries that gave impetus 
to Wittgenstein‟s concepts with blurred edges (PI 71) and family resemblance 
concepts (PI 67). The intellectual craving for neat, hermetic compartments can 
blur, rather than clarify philosophical analysis. Categories, like concepts, must 
be seen to be permeable if we are to get rid of explanatory gaps. We should 
have learned long ago, since Descartes proceeded to bridge the explanatory 
gap with the pineal gland, that relegating the body to one impermeable category 
and the mind to another will not do. We separate the mental (thought) and the 
physical (act) into incommensurable categories, but in fact what we call an act 
can manifest itself verbally (spontaneous utterances and, with added 
paraphernalia, performatives); and what we call thinking (believing, expecting, 
intending) need be nothing but a way of acting. Where propositionalists, so to 
speak, insist on logically prefacing our acts with a proposition or a thought, there 
need be only the act: my standing up need not be preceded by: „I believe that 
my feet are still there‟; my cringing need not be justified by: „I expect the dentist 
to hurt me as he approaches with his hypodermic needle‟; my opening the door 
need not be prompted by: „I intend to go out‟. The acts of standing, cringing and 
opening the door are not prompted by but embody or manifest or enact a belief, 
an expectation, an intention. Our beliefs, expectations, intentions are not 
always, as has traditionally been assumed, propositional attitudes. They can 
manifest themselves in what we do. This is Wittgenstein‟s late version of the 
saying-showing distinction
15
: 
 
... we can see from their actions that [people] believe certain things 
definitely, whether they express this belief or not. (OC 284; my emphasis) 
 
If someone is looking for something and perhaps roots around in a 
certain place, he shows that he believes that what he is looking for is there. 
(OC 288; my emphasis) 
 
To believe something may be equivalent to acting in a certain way. Belief can 
be expressed propositionally (said), but also nonpropositionally (shown) -- in our 
 18 
acts. And if a belief, a desire, an expectation or an intention can come in the 
form of a way of acting, philosophers need no longer seek to give them some 
functional, biological or propositional form that will explain how they prompt 
behaviour. If beliefs and intentions sometimes are behaviour, there is no logical 
incompatibility in kind between our beliefs and our actions. And therefore no 
gap. This is not to say that there is no categorial difference between words and 
deeds, only that the categories are porous. Or as Wittgenstein put it: 
 
Different concepts touch here and run some way together. But you need 
not think that all lines are circles. (PI p. 192; my translation) 
 
11. Conclusion 
 ... for is what is linguistic not an experience? 
 (Words are deeds.)  
 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar 
 
 Just as our words sometimes combine to form descriptions or falsifiable 
sentences -- that is, propositions -- they can also combine to form 
nonmanipulable expressions, the logical equivalent of acts. Wittgenstein‟s 
assimilation of some words to deeds effects precisely that crucial blurring of 
categories which shows that there is no necessary gap between our thoughts 
and acts. Word and deed cannot be incommensurable if they are sometimes 
commensurable, of the same nature. If some words are deeds, then the 
incommensurability between words and acts, and between mind and body 
vanishes. If some cases obviate the need for an explanatory link, then it can no 
longer be systematically postulated that there is a feeling, or sensation, or 
thought or anything behind our words or our acts that prompts them in some 
mysterious way. In some cases, to say „I want an apple‟ is to want an apple. 
And in those cases where the expression does not constitute the whole of the 
belief, feeling, desire, it can be seen as one of its manifestations rather than as 
its consequence. Thereby eluding the need for justification. And where there is 
no need for justification, no explanatory gap occurs.  
 
 Recognizing the exclusively pragmatic character of some first-person 
psychological deliverances is part of a larger task: that of conjuring all ghosts 
out of the machine -- which, it must be stressed, is not the same as saying that 
we have no inner life. It contributes to the general realization that what we say is 
not the result of an inner, nonverbalized thought process, and that some of what 
we say can be a primitive reaction -- part of our nonreflective, animal 
behaviour
16
. The immediacy of spontaneous utterances, their similarity to 
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reflexes, makes them exemplary instances of language not doing its traditional, 
representative act, but more radically pragmatic work. It is in such 
nonpropositional manifestations that language best shows itself as an extension 
of behaviour, which implies that, at some point, it must be of the same nature as 
behaviour -- that somewhere, these concepts touch and run some way together. 
It is in this fringe area that one suddenly perceives language as as much part of 
our natural expression of ourselves as are our feelings and actions and reflexes. 
Glimpsing the nature of spontaneous utterances changes our perspective on 
the whole landscape of language. The sophistication our language is capable of 
should no longer blind us to its origins, to its intimate relatedness to the 
behaviour we share with animals. Animals need no ghostly proposition to 
prompt their actions. Why should we? The fact that we are capable of intricate 
thought does not make intricate thought essential to our every move. 
 
 Peter Hacker has greatly contributed to the clarification of Wittgenstein‟s 
attempts to get the ghost out of the machine. But his insistence that words are 
never (for that is what it comes to) assimilable to deeds, and that some of our 
most spontaneous (unreflective) expressions are propositions open to pretence, 
prevents the ghost from vanishing. Hacker does not go all the way with 
Wittgenstein. He draws back at the crucial point. He acknowledges the forays, 
recognizes the clarifications, the demaskings, some of the reclassifications and 
rearrangements, but not the upheaval, not the revolution itself. Hacker‟s reading 
of Wittgenstein is a weak reading of Wittgenstein. Hacker‟s teetering on the 
brink prevents him from making the leap Wittgenstein made, and hinders our 
viewing the paradigm shift at hand. 
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NOTES
                                            
I am grateful to Avrum Stroll and Anat Matar for their invaluable comments on a previous draft 
of this paper. The present version owes much of its motivation to reactions of participants at 
the ESPP (European Society for Philosophy and Psychology) conference (Warwick, July 
1999), notably that of Daniel Statman. 
1
 The expression 'ghost in the machine' is Gilbert Ryle's. It appears in his Concept of Mind 
(1949) in the form: ' the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine', denounced as the "Cartesian 
category-mistake" of representing minds as ghosts harnessed to machines (p. 21). Though 
Ryle designates this as "Descartes' myth", he acknowledges its origin in Platonic and 
Aristotelian theories of the intellect as well as in theological doctrines of the soul (24). 
2Cf. PI 23, but this tripartite division of the function of language is due to Karl Bühler (1934), 
confirming Kevin Mulligan‟s thesis that “Bühler finds a system in what Wittgenstein presents as 
part of the inexhaustible variety of language” (1997, 209). Bühler speaks of „representation‟ 
rather than „description‟.  
3
Cf. RPP I, 693. As Michel ter Hark notes, the first-person descriptive  language-game is less 
often played and more demanding than the expressive one (1990, 114). A language-game for 
which I suggest we adopt: „self-observation‟ [Selbstbeobachtung] (PI 586) to avoid the inner 
voyeurism suggested by: „introspection‟, or Wittgenstein‟s overly technical reference to 
„functional states‟ (RPP I, 61). Such self-observation reaches its culmination in great thinkers: 
“myself has watched myself” writes D.H. Lawrence (Letters 1.39). 
4
Cf. respectively OC 510 and RPP I, 572. Wittgenstein does not consistently use these terms 
in this way.  
5
 Hacker repeatedly refers to avowals as 'spontaneous'; see (1993) 86, 89, 90, 92 etc. 
6
 I am not using the term 'compulsive' in its specialized, psychopathological connotation of 
obsessional, neurotic behaviour, of a person's acting against her wishes, but rather as alluding 
to behaviour that occurs not in accordance with one's wishes or thoughts, that is not rationally 
but emotionally driven; coming, as it were, from the guts. I want to relate the feature of these 
expressions that both Wittgenstein (LPE 281) and George Eliot (see epigram to Section 5) 
characterize in terms of: we can't help using them, and of which Eliot specifically writes that 
they "come without any will of my own" (my emphasis) – not against her will. Other terms I have 
envisaged have proved more equivocal: e.g.  'reflexive' (means both 'of the nature of reflex' 
and 'of the nature of reflection').  
7
As opposed to such „passive‟ states of feeling as sensory impressions and kinaesthetic 
sensations. 
8
Hertzberg (1992) distinguishes two senses in Wittgenstein‟s use of the notion of „primitive‟: a 
logical sense, indicating the place occupied by a type of reaction or utterance in relation to a 
language-game; and an anthropological sense, connected with understanding the place of a 
reaction in the life of a human being. I would add: in the history of the human species -- and so: 
primitive in the phylogenetic sense as well. It is of course the logical place of spontaneous 
utterances in our language-games that is of philosophical interest, but Wittgenstein‟s method 
of philosophizing „by example‟, appeals to anthropological cases in point. 
9
That language is based on convention does not make some of our uses of it less automatic. 
Our language has been, for the most part, drilled into us, and in ordinary usage (vs. specialized 
usage such as philosophical discussion or scientific classification), we use its more ordinary 
terms (table, rain, people, flower, street etc.) habitually, without precursory reflection, hesitation 
or recall. We certainly do not reflect before articulating our spontaneous utterances.  
10
The notable exceptions to this being Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) and J.L. Austin. The 
inclusion of nonlinguistic fields in language was precisely effected by Karl Bühler. 
11
A section heading in (1989), p. 297 and a chapter heading in (1993). Hacker consistently 
uses „avowal‟ to denote nondescriptive linguistic expressions. Elsewhere, the spectrum is said 
to be composed of “sentences” (1993, 92) or “propositions” (1996, 181). 
12
Where objective certainty is depicted as the fundamental, nonepistemic assurance that 
underpins and enables knowing. 
13
I cannot here engage in a discussion of the link between spontaneous utterances and what 
Wittgenstein calls „secondary meaning‟, where expressions are governed by criteria, not of 
truth, but of truthfulness or sincerity (cf. PI p. 222).  
14
For a discussion of the nonpropositional nature of hinge beliefs, see my „Wittgenstein 
distinguished: A Response to Pieranna Garavaso‟s “The distinction between the logical and 
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the empirical in On Certainty,” Philosophical Investigations 21:3 (1998)‟, Philosophical 
Investigations (January 2000). 
15
 I agree with John Koethe's view on the "pervasiveness of showing and seeing" in 
Wittgenstein's work, but not with his interpretation of the distinction (The Continuity of 
Wittgenstein's Thought (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), passim). I believe 
that what is shown is what, though verbally articulated, in fact cannot logically be said 
inasmuch as it is not propositional (in Wittgenstein's consistently bipolar view of the 
proposition), not susceptible of truth or falsity. I believe Wittgenstein to have focused on two 
large classes of cases where words do not meaningfully say, but only show. These are rules 
(grammatical and others -- the pronouncements of the Tractatus belong here, as well as the 
'hinge' beliefs of On Certainty) and spontaneous utterances.  
16
 Norman Malcolm (Nothing is hidden: Wittgenstein's criticism of his early thought. Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1986 & Wittgensteinian Themes: Essays 1978-1989. Ed. G.H. von Wright. NY: 
Cornell UP, 1995) and Paul Johnston (Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner. London, Routledge, 
1993) have especially contributed to elucidating this crucial aspect of Wittgenstein's thought. 
 
This is the final, pre-publication draft. Please cite only from published paper in  
Philosophical Psychology 13:3 (September 2000), 355-72. 
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